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Commercial Law
By RICHARD H. NOWKA*
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code continues to be a
fruitful source of judicial and legislative activity. In the last two
years there have been twenty cases' and five legislative acts' having
a bearing on the Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code. One
legislative act and three cases are particularly noteworthy for the
commercial law practitioner. In the Automated Motor Vehicle
Registration System Act,3 the General Assembly has provided
Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.S. 1973, Wayne State Col-
lege; J.D. 1976, Creighton University.
' See Overstreet v. Norden Labs., Inc., 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing KY.
REv. STAT. § 355.2-313) (Bobbs-Merrill 1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS]); Kimberly &
European Diamonds, Inc. v. Burbank, 518 F. Supp. 599 (W.D. Ky. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d
363 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.2-403 (1970)); In re Wilson, 17 Bankr. 350 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.9-204 (1970)); In re Hopper, 17 Bankr. 292 (Bankr.
W.D.Ky. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.9-204 (1970)); In re Harris, 17 Bankr. 210 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.9-204 (1970)); In re Calloway, 17 Bankr. 212 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.9-204 (1970)); In re Fulkerson, 17 Bankr. 207 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.9-204 (1970)); In re Radcliffe Door Co., Inc., 17 Bankr. 153
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.9-302, -403 (1970 & Supp. 1982)); Peoples Security
Fin. v. Aldrich, 16 Bankr. 825 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.9-204 (1970));
Associate Fin. v. Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. KY. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.9-107
(1970)); In re Velasco, 13 Bankr. 872 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (citing KRS § 355.1-105
(1970)); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. McGrew, 20 Bankr. 264 (Bankr. W.D.
KY. 1981) (citing KRS § 355.9-103 (1970)); Tabers v. Jackson Purchase Prod. Credit Ass'n,
649 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (citing KRS § 355.9-105 (Cum. Supp. 1982)); American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Shouse & Burris, 648 S.W.2d 540 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (citing KRS
§ 355.8-102, 103, 201 (1970 & Supp. 1982)); United Ky. Bank v. Eagle Mach. Co., Inc.,
644 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (citing KRS § 355.4-202 (1970)); Vanover v. Bank
of Alexandria, 644 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (citing KRS § 355.9-302(1970)); Bonded
Elevator, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 29 Ky. L. SuMm. 10 at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as KLS] (citing KRS § 355.7-204 (1970)); Corbin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Mullins
Enters., Inc., 641 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (citing KRS § 355.3-109(1) (1970));
Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Joseph, 641 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (citing
KRS § 355.1-102 & 2-102 (1970)); ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Union Bank & Trust, 615 S.W.2d
2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (citing KRS § 355.9-204 (1970)).
2 1982 Ky. Acts, ch. 329, § I at 897 (amending KRS § 355.8-311 (1970)); 1982 KY.
Acts, ch. 199, § 2 at 506-07 (amending KRS § 355.9-312 (1970)); 1982 Ky. Acts, ch. 199,
§ I at 506 (amending KRS § 355.9-301 (1970)); 1982 Ky. Acts, ch. 164 at 350-74 (enacting
the Automated Motor Vehicle Registration System Act KRS § § 186A.010-.990 (Cum. Supp.
1982)); 1982 Ky. Acts, ch. 89, § 1 at 164-65 (amending KRS § 355.9-307 (1970)).
3 KRS § § 186A.010-.990 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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stability for the procedure of perfecting a security interest in a motor
vehicle. The case of ITT Industrial Credit Co. v. Union Bank &
Trust Co.,' limited the ability of an original financing statement
to fix the priority of a subsequent advance made by the same secured
party when the subsequent advance was neither contemplated by
the original parties nor covered in the security agreement by a future
advance clause. In Tabers v. Jackson Purchase Production Credit
Association,5 the court of appeals disregarded the priority scheme
of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 355.9-301(1)(c). Finally,
the case of Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Joseph,6 enlarged
the scope of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code to in-
clude equipment leases.
I. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN MOTOR
VEHICLES AND THE AUTOMATED MOTOR
VEHICLE REGISTRATION SYSTEM
Motor vehicles continue to be a fertile source of collateral for
secured transactions. Proper perfection of such security interests
is necessary to insure the priority of the secured party in the
collateral.' This has not been an easy task in Kentucky. Prior to
the passage of the Automated Motor Vehicle Registration System
Act (Act),8 Kentucky case law9 and statutes'" combined to make
the path to perfection of security interests in motor vehicles one
strewn with uncertainties.II The Act should prove to make the pro-
cess more definite and less hazardous for the unwary.
4 615 S.W.2d 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
649 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
6 641 S.W.2d 753 (Ky Ct. App. 1982).
See KRS §§ 355.9-301-.9-318, 186A.190-.195 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
KRS §§ 186A.010-.990 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hodge, 485 S.W.2d 894 (Ky 1972); Lincoln
Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961); McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d
102 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"o See KRS § 186.045 (1980).
" Under KRS § 186.045(1), (2), both the filing of a financing statement and the nota-
tion of the security interest on the certificate of registration and ownership were required
to perfect a security interest in a motor vehicle. The Kentucky courts never decided whether
KRS § 186.045 was the type of statute contemplated by KRS § 355.9-302(3),(4) (1970) where
filing was unnecessary, and perfection could only result when the security interest was noted
on a certificate of registration. Therefore, it appeared that a secured party could perfect
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The Act must be compared with Article Nine of the Kentucky
Uniform Commercial Code12 to determine its effect. KRS section
355.9-302(3) provides that the provisions of Article Nine providing
for perfection by filing a financing statement, "do not apply to
a security interest in property subject to a statute ... of this state
.. which requires indication on a certificate of title of such security
interests in such property." This would seem to imply that if a
Kentucky statute requires indication of a security interest in a motor
vehicle on the certificate of title for the vehicle, the perfection by
filing provisions of Article Nine do not apply.'3 How then may
a security interest in the motor vehicle be perfected? KRS section
355.9-302(4) allows perfection only by indication of the security
interest on the vehicle's certificate of title. Thus, two options exist:
perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle by filing a financ-
ing statement; or perfection by indication of the security interest
on the certificate of title. The correct choice may be determined
by examining the provisions of the Act to see if it includes the
provisions contemplated by KRS section 355.9-302(3), (4).
The question is whether the Act requires indication of a security
interest in a motor vehicle on the certificate of title. KRS section
186A. 190 is entitled: "Financing statement required on title docu-
ment." It provides that "[flinancing statements relating to vehicles
required to be titled ... shall be filed in the office of the county
a security interest and have priority established simply by filing a financing statement.
However, the Kentucky courts chose not to accept that argument.
Two Kentucky cases involved a question of priority between a secured party whose
security interest was not noted on a certificate of registration and an innocent subsequent
purchaser. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hodge, 485 S.W.2d 894, 895 (Ky.
1972) (financing statement filed); McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102,103-05 (no financ-
ing statement filing). Both courts pinned their decisions on the fact that the security in-
terest was not noted on the certificate of registration, and held against the secured party,
in favor of the innocent purchaser. 485 S.W.2d at 895-97; 571 S.W.2d at 107-08. Since
neither court addressed the issue of whether KRS § 186.045(1),(2) (1980) and KRS §
355.9-302(3), (4) (1970) rendered the Article 9 filing provisions inapplicable, or whether
filing alone was sufficient to perfect the security interest, secured parties in Kentucky were
left in a state of confusion as to the effect of only filing a financing statement.
KRS §§ 355.9-101-9.507 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
' Courts in other states have held that security interests in motor vehicles may be
perfected only by notation of the lien on the certificate of title. See Davis v. Kisko, 7 Bankr.
10, 13 (Bankr. W.D. Fla. 1980); McLemore v. Simpson Co. Bank, 6 Bankr. 443, 447 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1980).
1983-84]
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clerk of the county in which the debtor resides."'" Nothing in that
section requires indication of the security interest on the certificate
of title. KRS section 186A.190(4) comes closer to such a require-
ment by providing for "recording the filing of a financing state-
ment upon a certificate of title." Greater clarity in this matter could
have been provided had the subsection "required" the clerk to
record the information present on the financing statement on the
certificate of title. However, the section's heading and its language
indicate that the security interest must be noted on the certificate
of title. This conclusion makes KRS section 186A. 190 the type of
statute contemplated by KRS section 355.9-302(3).
Further support for this proposition comes from KRS section
186A.195(l), which provides that when "a financing statement and
the required fees accompany the application for first title of a vehicle
... the county clerk shall enter the information required by KRS
[section] 186A. 190(4) into the automated system" so that the cer-
tificate of title bears such information.
If any doubt exists regarding the legislative intent of the method
of perfection for a security interest in a motor vehicle, KRS sec-
tion 186A.190(1) should resolve it: "Notwithstanding the existence
of any filed financing statement relating to any vehicle . . . the
sole means of determining priority of security interests in such vehi-
cle shall be the notation of the security interest on such vehicle's
registration or title." Perfection and priority go hand in hand.
Legislative intent reveals that even if a financing statement has
been filed, there is no priority without notation of the security in-
terest on the title. The Act requires notation (or indication) of the
security interest on the certificate of title for priority purposes.5
Obviously, this is a step in the perfection of a security interest in
a motor vehicle which is achieved by filing a financing statement
with the county clerk and insuring that the financing statement
is recorded on the certificate of title.16
Why does the legislation confuse the issue by requiring the filing
of a financing statement? Perhaps the best way to insure a simple
method of placing the required information with the county clerk
KRS § 186A.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
See KRS § 186A.190(1).
16 Id.
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is to require a financing statement. Further, the financing state-
ment form is a familiar process for the bar. The legislature could
have provided that the financing statement be "presented" to the
county clerk, but "filing" accomplishes that in a well understood
manner. Be advised, however, that simply filing will not result in
perfection or priority. Recall that KRS section 355.9-302(3), (4) pro-
vides that when a Kentucky statute requires indication of a securi-
ty interest on a certificate of title, Article Nine filing provisions
for perfection are not applicable.
A branch of the problem which existed prior to enactment of
the Act is still troublesome. KRS section 186.045 survived the
passage of the Act. It provides for the filing of a financing state-
ment and for notation of the security interest on the certificate
of registration and ownership." Notation of the security interest
on the certificate of registration has been held necessary for priority
in the vehicle,'" and a certificate of registration is still required
by the Act.' 9 Is notation of the security interest on the certificate
of registration a necessary step for perfection? The Act does not
require it, but KRS section 186.045 does.2" There is no reason why
such a step should be required. Indication on the certificte of title,
a permanent document,2' is more definite. Furthermore, the cer-
" KRS § 186.045(1)-(2)(a) (1980).
" See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hodge, 485 S.W.2d at 895; McKenzie
v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d at 103-05.
See KRS § 186A.065 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
KRS § 186.045(2)(a) provides:
Whenever a financing statement required by KRS chapter 355 relating to any
vehicle registered or required to be registered in Kentucky for use on the
highway is presented to a county clerk for filing, such clerk shall also im-
mediately note information required by the department relative thereto on
the owner's copy of the certificate of registration and ownership or transfer
receipt issued for the current registration period as noted in subsection (2)
of KRS 186.170, which the secured party must obtain and present to the county
clerk, along with the financing statement, within fifteen (15) days, exclusive
of Sundays and holidays, after execution of the security agreement. The clerk
shall also note such information on the clerk's copy of the certificate of registra-
tion and ownership or transfer receipt maintained in his office in numerical
order. The clerk noting the information on the owner's copy of the certificate
of registration and ownership or transfer receipt shall return such receipt to
the owner within five (5) days after making such notation....
" KRS § 186A.180 (Cur. Supp. 1982) provides that an owner is not required to
periodically renew a certificate of title.
1983-84]
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tificate of registration produced when a vehicle is registered has
no place for such a notation; only the certificate of title contains
a space for indication of a security interest.
Greater certainty in this issue would have resulted had the Act
required the clerk to record the information noted on a financing
statement on a certificate of title rather than providing for "record-
ing the filing of a financing statement"22 and had the legislation
repealed the provisions of KRS section 186.045 which continue
to require indication of the security interest on the certificate of
registration. It seems clear, however, that the provisions of the
Act represent the type of statute contemplated by KRS section
355.9-302(3), (4). Therefore, perfection of a security interest in a
motor vehicle in Kentucky is achieved through compliance with
KRS sections 186A.190 and 186A.195.
II. A LIMITATION ON THE OPERATION OF FUTURE ADVANCE CLAUSES
ITT Industrial Credit Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co.23
presented an Article Nine priority contest between two secured par-
ties with security interests in the same collateral. In ITT, Hogan,
the debtor, "executed a security agreement [without a future ad-
vance clause] and a financing statement listing [a] trencher as
collateral."" The security agreement, executed in 1973, called for
full payment by September, 1977. This security interest was assigned
to ITT, and the security agreement and financing statement were
filed to perfect the security interest. In 1975, Hogan created another
security interest in favor of Union Bank and Trust Co. (Union
Bank). The obligation to Union Bank was secured in part by the
"trencher." A few weeks after the obligation to ITT was repaid,
Hogan financed an equipment purchase with a loan from ITT.
A new security agreement which listed the "trencher" as collateral
was executed and filed in October of 1977. Both ITT and Union
Bank claimed priority in the trencher. 5
The court of appeals framed the issue as follows:
22 KRS § 186A.190(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
2" 615 S.W.2d 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
21 Id. at 2.
11 Id. at 2-3.
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[W]hat priority must be given to a perfected security interest
in a single large item of equipment, as evidenced by a recorded
security agreement and a financing statement which make no pro-
visions for future advances, in relation to a subsequent creditor
with a perfected interest in the same item, after the obligation
of the first security agreement has been paid in full and the
original creditor makes a new loan for new and different equip-
ment taking a new security agreement and naming the original
item as additional collateral[?]1
6
Since the court chose to analyze the case as a future advance
problem,27 a brief discussion of future advances under the Ken-
tucky Uniform Commercial Code is in order. As the Code pro-
vides, "[o]bligations covered by a security agreement may include
future advances or other value whether or not the advances or value
are given pursuant to commitment." 28 This section allows the
secured party to include a clause in the security agreement which
provides that the collateral secures not only the existing obligation
but any future obligations owed the secured party by the debtor.
When such a clause is included in a security agreement, the parties
need not execute a separate security agreement when the subse-
quent advance is made because the original security agreement
covers the subsequent advance.2 9 If the security agreement is
perfected by filing a financing statement which adequately describes
the collateral, no further filing is necessary. 30 Accordingly, a future
advance clause allows the parties to secure several obligations with
one security agreement and one financing statement.
The priority of the subsequent advance is governed by KRS
section 355.9-312(5)(a) which gives priority between conflicting
security interests in the same collateral in the order of filing
regardless of which security interest attached first and whether it
attached before or after filing." For example, suppose Gannon
takes a security interest in equipment and perfects it by filing a
26 Id. at 3.
" Id. at 3-5.
2 KRS § 355.9-204(5) (1970).
11 U.C.C. § 9-204 Comment 8 (1962).
10 U.C.C. § 9-204 Comment 5 (1972).
", Note that KRS § 355.9-402(l) (1970) validates the practice of filing a financing
statement before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches.
1983-84]
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financing statement on February 1. The security agreement includes
a future advance clause. On March 1, Kean takes a security in-
terest in the same equipment and also perfects it by filing a financ-
ing statement. Gannon makes a further advance against the same
machinery on May 1. The advance is covered by the original
financing statement and thus perfected when made. Gannon has
priority over Kean under KRS section 9-312(5)(a) as to both ad-
vances because he filed first even though Kean's security interest
attached and was perfected before the May 1 advance.
32
The court of appeals in ITT focused on the fact that the security
agreement involved did not include a future advance clause 33 and
thus the parties apparently did not contemplate future advances
secured by the trencher.34 The court stated:
[I]t is better practice ... to require the original creditor to pro-
vide in his agreement for future advances, if there is an agree-
ment between the debtor and the creditor for such advances. In
our opinion, the statute requires this statement, and such a state-
ment provides actual notice of the intention to a would-be subse-
quent creditor."
Due to those factors, the court refused to allow the priority of
ITT's 1977 security interest to be determined by the 1973 financ-
ing statement.36 Thus, ITT's security interest was inferior to Union
Bank's security interest.
The court of appeals' reasoning was correct in that the Uniform
Commercial Code "support[s] the view that the [security] agree-
ment must specifically provide for future advances." ' 37 However,
that statement is valid only in relation to a situation where the
" See U.C.C. § 9-312 Comment 4 (1962). See also Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v.
Cheney Inv., Inc., 605 P.2d 525 (Kan. 1980); Thorp Fin. Corp. v. Ken Hodgins & Sons,
251 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
" The court made such statements as "a recorded security agreement and a financ-
ing statement which make no provision for future advances"; "where the original security
agreement did not provide for future advances"; and "[t]he Official Code Comment appears
to support the view that the agreement must specifically provide for future advances." ITT
Indus. Credit Co. v. Union Bank & Trust, 615 S.W.2d at 3-4.
3, "[I]t is certainly not apparent that ITT and Hogan [the debtor] contemplated the
future advance at the time the time the original loan was made." 615 S.W.2d at 4.
11 Id. at 5.
36 Id.
1 Id. at 4.
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parties want to make the execution of another security agreement
unnecessary. Thus, the issue is not determined by merely quoting
the future advance clause rule.
The true issue in ITT is one the court did not directly address:
can a financing statement, filed to perfect the original security in-
terest, perfect a separate security interest for future advances using
the same collateral as the original transaction when no future ad-
vance clause is included in the original security agreement. The
answer is yes and thus, ITT should have had priority in the trencher
under the first to file rule of KRS section 355.9-312(5)(a). This
issue is the other branch of future advances. KRS Section
355.9-204(5) provides simply that "[o]bligations covered by a securi-
ty agreement may include future advances." 3 Future (or subse-
quent) advances can be made pursuant to a future advance clause
in a security agreement under KRS section 355.9-204(5), but they
may also be made pursuant to a separate security agreement. If
this is not accurate, the creditor who failed to include a future
advance clause in the original security agreement would be pro-
hibited from taking another security interest in the same collateral.
Such a result would certainly not facilitate commercial transac-
tions and clearly would be at odds with the purposes and policies
of the Uniform Commercial Code."
Recall the facts of ITT. In 1973, ITT perfected a security in-
terest in the trencher by filing the security agreement and a financ-
ing statement. 0 In 1975, Union Bank perfected a security interest
in the same trencher by filing a financing statement. In 1977, after
the original obligation was repaid, ITT secured a subsequent ad-
vance with the trencher and a new security agreement was executed.
ITT's filed financing statement preceded the attachment of its
second security interest.,"
The Uniform Commercial Code clearly allows a financing state-
ment to be filed "before a security agreement is made or a security
interest otherwise attaches." ' 42 Article Nine and its Official Coin-
1, KRS § 355.9-204(3) (emphasis added).
39 See KRS § 355.1-102 (1970).
40 615 S.W.2d at 2. Filing of the security agreement was not necessary. See KRS
§ 355.9-402(1).
11 615 S.W.2d at 2-3. A security interest cannot attach until there is an agreement
that it attach, value is given, and the debtor has rights in the collateral. KRS § 355.9-204(1).
2 See KRS § 355.9-402(1).
1983-84]
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ments also speak of the situation where "the steps for perfection
have been taken in advance (as when the secured party files a finan-
cing statement before giving value or before the debtor acquires
rights in the collateral)." 43 ITT completed the steps for perfection
by filing a financing statement before the second secured trans-
action occured. When the new security interest attached it was
automatically perfected." Thus, ITT involved a priority contest
between secured parties who perfected by filing a financing state-
ment. The first to file receives priority "regardless of which security
interest attached first ... and whether it attached before or after
filing." 5 Applying KRS section 355.9-312(5)(a) to the ITT case,
ITT had priority in the trencher because it was first to file a f'manc-
ing statement covering the trencher. The Official Comment sup-
ports this conclusion:
A files against X (debtor) on February 1. B files against X on
March 1. B makes a non-purchase money advance against cer-
tain collateral on April 1. A makes an advance against the same
collateral on May 1. A has priority even though B's advance was
made earlier and was perfected when made. It makes no dif-
ference whether or not A knew of B's interest when he made
his advance.
The problem stated in the example is peculiar to a notice
filing system under which filing may be made before the security
interest attaches (see Section 9-402) .... This Article follows
several of the accounts receivable statutes in determining priori-
ty by order of filing. The justification for the rule lies in the
necessity of protecting the filing system-that is, of allowing the
secured party who has first filed to make subsequent advances
without each time having, as a condition of protection, to check
for filings later than his.46
While the example pertains to the first advance made by a secured
party, nothing would compel a departure from the rule when the
advance is not the original advance but an advance subsequent
to the original obligation.
.3 U.C.C. § 9-303 & Comment 1 (1962). KRS § 355.9-303(l) (1970) states "[i]f such
steps are taken before the security interest attaches, it is perfected at the time when it attaches."
" See KRS § 355.9-303(1).
,5 KRS § 355.9-312(5)(a) (emphasis added). For a general discussion of this section
see text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
46 U.C.C. § 9-312 Comment 4 (1962).
[Vol. 72
COMMERCAL LAW
The court of appeals found support for its holding in Coin-O-
Matic Service Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. 4 The facts
of Coin-O-Matic are similar to ITT. An advance subsequent to
the original secured transaction was made by Rhode Island Hospital
Trust under a new security agreement after the intervening security
interest of Coin-O-Matic had arisen. 8 The main difference in the
cases was that in Coin-O-Matic, part of the original debt was
outstanding when the subsequent advance was made.49 Rhode Island
Hospital Trust rightfully contended, under the equivalent of KRS
section 355.9-312(5)(a), that "the original financing statement is
an umbrella which gives the defendant a priority with respect to
its second security transaction notwithstanding that the plaintiff's
security interest was established in point of time prior to defen-
dant's second security transaction." 5 The court responded:
[T]he reasonable interpretation of 6 A-9-312 [KRS section
355.9-3121 is that a security agreement which does not provide
for future advances is a single transaction and in the case of subse-
quent security agreements there is required a new financing state-
ment. That is to say, a single financing statement in connection
with a security agreement when no provision is made for future
advances is not an umbrella for future advances based upon new
security agreements, notwithstanding the fact that involved is the
same collateral."
Focusing on the intent of the debtor and the original secured party,
the court found the parties intended the original transaction to
be terminated and the subsequent advance to be a separate and
unrelated transaction.52 Subordinating the subsequent advance to
the intervening security interest, the court held the priority given
to the first to file a financing statement by the Rhode Island
equivalent of KRS section 355.9-312(5) does not relate to a separate
and distinct security transaction.
5 3
The Kentucky Court of Appeals may have been influenced by
the Coin-O-Matic rationale, though the rationale of ITT is unclear.
3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1112 (R.I. 1966).
,' Id. at 1113-14.
41 Id. at 1114.
51 Id. at 1115.
11 Id. at 1120.
" Id.
s Id.
1983-84]
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The court indicated that ITT and the debtor apparently did not
contemplate the future advance at the time the original loan was
made 4 and that ITT was attempting to resurrect a financing state-
ment which had not expired at the time of its new loan." These
factors fit well into the rationale of Coin-O-Matic, but the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals did not articulate such a theory. This makes
ITT a difficult case to analyze for the secured party in a position
similar to ITT.
ITT had supported its position with the case of Allis-Chalmers
Credit Corp. v. Cheney Investment, Inc.56 The facts of Allis-
Chalmers are similar to ITT and Coin-O-Matic. The debtor created
a security interest in a combine in favor of an Allis-Chalmers equip-
ment dealer who then assigned the security interest to Allis-Chalmers
Credit Corporation. The security agreement contained no future
advance clause. One month later the debtor created a security in-
terest in favor of Cheney Investment using the same collateral.
When the debtor subsequently purchased additional equipment from
Allis-Chalmers on credit, the original obligation was cancelled and
the balance owing on it included in the balance due on the subse-
quent obligation. A security interest had been taken by Allis-
Chalmers in the original combine. The issue was whether the original
financing statement fixed the priority of the subsequent security
interest. 17
The Allis-Chalmers court rejected the Coin-O-Matic holding
and noted that the vast majority of jurisdictions had also rejected
Coin-O-Matic." The decision of the Kansas court awarding the
subsequent security interest priority over the intervening security
interest was based primarily on the remarks regarding Coin-O-Matic
made by the Uniform Commercial Code Permanent Editorial Board
and by the Official Comments to Article Nine.5
9
When revisions to the 1962 Uniform Commercial Code were
being considered by the Permanent Editorial Board Review Com-
mittee for Article Nine, the committee "considered drafting a pro-
"4 ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 615 S.W.2d at 4.
55 Id.
56 605 P.2d 525 (Kan. 1980).
" Id. at 525-26.
" Id. at 529-31.
'9 See id. at 530-31.
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vision emphasizing its disagreement with the Coin-O-Matic line
of cases, but concluded that the existing Code [the 1962 Code]
is clear enough, and should not be disturbed just to overrule some
lower court cases." 60 The Official Comments now include the
following paragraph:
However, even in the case of filings that do not necessarily in-
volve a series of transactions the financing statement is effective
to encompass transactions under a security agreement not in ex-
istence and not contemplated at the time the notice was filed,
if the description of the collateral in the financing statement is
broad enough to encompass them.6"
An addition to the Official Comments also supports ITT's position:
The filing of a financing statement is effective to perfect security
interests as to which the other required elements for perfection
exist, whether the security agreement involved is one existing at
the date of filing with an after acquired property clause or a future
advance clause, or whether the applicable security agreement is
executed later .... There is no need to refer to after acquired
property or future advances in the financing statement.6 2
However, the best evidence may come from the Official Comments
to U.C.C. section 9-312:
Example 5. On February 1 A makes an advance against machinery
in the debtor's possession and files his financing statement. On
March 1 B makes an advance against the same machinery and
files his financing statement. On April 1 A makes a further ad-
vance, under the original security agreement, against the same
machinery (which is covered by the original financing statement
and thus perfected when made). A has priority over B both as
to the February 1 and as to the April 1 advance and it makes
no difference whether or not A knows of B's intervening ad-
vance when he makes his second advance.
A wins, as to the April 1 advance, because he first filed even
though B's interest attached, and indeed was perfected, before
the April 1 advance. . ..
60 PERmANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW COM-
mrTEE FOR ARTICLE NINE OF THE U.C.C., FNAL REPORT E-40, at 227 (April 25, 1971).
61 U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 3 (1972).
612 U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 5 (1972), (U.C.C. § 9-204 deals with future advances).
1983-84]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
The same result would be reached even though A's April
1 advance was not under the original security agreement, but
was under a new security agreement under A's same financing
statement . . . 63
Thus, the drafters of Article Nine would clearly support the
priority of ITT. If the court had been writing on a clean slate,
the argument that an uncontemplated subsequent advance not made
pursuant to a future advance clause requires a new financing state-
ment might be defensible. The language of the comments to the
Uniform Commercial Code, however, compels a different
conclusion.
In addition to the fact that ITT and the debtor apparently did
not contemplate the future advance,"' the court of appeals also
grounded its decision on the notice Union Bank obtained from
ITT's filing of both the financing statement and the security
agreement .6 The terms of the security agreement called for pay-
ment in full by September, 1977, with no provison for future
advances." The following statements made by the court indicate
that it was concerned with the notice Union Bank received from
the information contained in the documents filed for record by ITT:
There are also many times, however, when the subsequent creditor
desires to do business with the debtor and to make what appears
to be a good loan. In such instances the subsequent creditor may
not want the first creditor to know that the debtor is now bring-
ing his business elsewhere. In such cases, the subsequent creditor
should be able to rely upon the records and the law.
We have already pointed out why we believe a subsequent creditor
should not be required to contact the original creditor when there
is no written provision or indication that the security agreement
covers future advances .... The bank knew that ITT had priority
in the 1973 trencher for as long as the interest contemplated
existed. If the debt was paid as required, it would be satisfied
in 1977. The Bank therefore reasoned that after that time, it
63 U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 7 (1972) (emphasis indicates statements added subse-
quent to the Coin-O-Matic decision).
64 See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
6, See 615 S.W.2d at 2-4.
616 Id. at 2.
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would have a good and valid first lien on both the 1973 and 1976
trenchers.67
The court's reliance on the notice Union Bank obtained from
the filings is misplaced. Security agreements need not be filed"8
and financing statements are not required to include either the
maturity date of the obligation69 or the fact that the security agree-
ment covers future advances." The logic of protecting a creditor
based on the type of notice it received from the filings does not
extend to the usual situation where only a financing statement is
filed. Therefore, such logic should not be employed as the under-
pinnings of a decision which will influence the course of commer-
cial practice.
One basis arguably exists for the court's decision in 1TT, though
the court failed to consider it. KRS section 355.9-404(2) requires
a secured party to file a termination statement indicating the security
interest is no longer claimed under the financing statement within
fifteen days after a security interest has terminated.' Upon presen-
tation of a termination statement the filing officer removes the
financing statement from the files.72 Based on the existence of such
a duty, the argument could be made that even if a termination
statement is not filed, the validity of the financing statement ceases
once the secured transaction, and thus the security interest,
terminates.73 I do not think KRS section 355.9-404(2) forces such
a conclusion. Although the section imposes a duty on the secured
party to "clear the record," 7 the damages for breach of the duty
run solely to the debtor." Furthermore, to reach such a conclu-
67 Id. at 2-4 (emphasis added).
" KRS § 355.9-402(1).
69 Id.
,1 U.C.C § 9-204 comment 8 (1962). See also U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 5 (1972).
" KRS § 355.9-404(2) (1970).
2 KRS § 355.9-404(3) (1970).
1, Cf. In re Hagler, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1285 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1972).
In Hagler, the bankruptcy referee gave priority to the "intervening creditor" basing his
decision in part on TENN. CODE Am. § 47-9-404 (1981) (U.C.C. § 9404) and TENN. CODE
ANN. chapter 25, § 64-2501 [currently found at TENN CoDE ANx. § 66-25-101 (1983)] which
required a mortgagee to satisfy the record when a debt secured by a lien has been fully
satisfied. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1287-88.
" KRS § 355.9-404(2).
75 Id..
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sion by implication, when other sections of Article Nine such as
KRS sections 355.9-312 and .9-402, specifically allow one financ-
ing statement to perfect and determine priority for separate security
interests, would not be in accord with sound rules of construction.
Failure to file a termination statement may result in damage to
the debtor, but that is its only consequence under KRS section
355.9-404(2). It mandates no change in priorities.
In ITT, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has aligned itself with
a small minority of jurisdictions which have not recognized the
full potential of the notice filing system contemplated by the drafters
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The drafters intended for one
financing statement to perfect and establish priority for several
security interests, whether they arose pursuant to a future advance
clause or separate security agreements, so long as the collateral
was the same. The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that unless
a security agreement includes a future advance clause the priority
of a subsequent security interest in the same collateral cannot be
governed by the original financing statement. Such a holding does
not facilitate commercial transactions since the secured party who
wishes to make a subsequent advance, but did not include a future
advance clause in the original security agreement, must now file
another financing statement. This creates a situation where the un-
wary secured party may lose priority of a security interest when
the intention of the Uniform Commercial Code is to give that
security interest priority.
III. THE PURCHASER AND THE UNPERFECTED SECURED PARTY
The priority between a purchaser of goods at a sheriff's execu-
tion sale and a secured party with a security interest in the goods
which remained unsatisfied after the execution sale was presented
in Tabers v. Jackson Purchase Production Credit Association."6
Kenneth and Pamela Green created a security interest in a 1979
Jeep in favor of Jackson Purchase Production Credit Association
(PCA). The Greens gave Phil Archer a subordinate security in-
terest in the Jeep. When the Greens defaulted in payment to the
PCA, it brought suit to obtain a money judgment against the
Greens."' Phil Archer sought to intervene in the action alleging
76 649 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
" Id. Such a suit for money damages is permissible under KRS § 355.9-501 (1970).
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the existence of a security interest, but he asked for a money judg-
ment, not enforcement of the security interest."8 Both PCA and
Archer were awarded money judgments." The Jeep was sold at
a sheriff's execution sale but Archer realized no proceeds from
the sale. 0 Archer then began proceedings under KRS section 426.290
to have the Jeep resold to satisfy his security interest.' Gerald
Tabers, purchaser at the execution sale, contended that the security
interest was subordinate to his interest as purchaser of the Jeep. 2
Archer admited that his security interest was unperfected
because his financing statement had lapsed8 3 Therefore, Archer
and Tabers considered the issue to be whether an unperfected non-
purchase money security interest takes priority over a subsequent
purchaser.14 Both parties argued KRS section 355.9-301(1)(c) con-
trolled the issue. This section provides:
[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
... a person who is not a secured party and who is a transferee
in bulk or other buyer not in the ordinary course of business
to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the col-
lateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it
is perfected.85
Tabers was not a secured party and was a buyer not in the ordinary
course of business.86 The fact that Taber was a purchaser at a
judicial sale does not prevent the operation of KRS section
355.9-301 87
The only condition of KRS section 355.9-301(1)(c) in
controversy was whether Tabers had knowledge of the security in-
" Brief for Appellant Gerald Tabers at 2, Tabers v. Jackson Purchase Prod. Credit
Ass'n, 649 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983). See 649 S.W.2d at 203.
9 649 S.W.2d at 202.
80 Id. Both PCA and Archer levied an execution on the Jeep, but Archer's execution
was returned "no property found," despite the sheriff's possession of the Jeep at the time
pursuant to PCA's execution. Id.
8, Id. KRS § 426.290 (1970) allows encumbered property of the defendant to be sold
subject to the encumbrance. In order to satisfy the encumbrance, a creditor holding an
encumbrance not satisfied in the execution sale may subject the property to a second sale. Id.
82 649 S.W.2d at 203.
,3 Brief for Appellee Phil Archer at 6, Tabers v. Jackson Purchase Prod. Credit
Ass'n, 649 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
4 Id. at 5.
KRS § 355.9-301(1)(c).
See 649 S.W.2d at 203.
'7 See D. LEmSON & R. NowcA, Tim UIroR COMMERCIAL CODE OF KENTUCKY
§ 8.4(B)(2), at 753 (1983).
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terest. Archer contended Tabers had such knowledge because a
security interest was shown on the Jeep's license receipt on file
with the county clerk and Archer's financing statement (although
it had lapsed) was on file with the county clerk. 88 Tabers argued
that the judgment for Archer made no mention of a security in-
terest and that the "Notice of Sheriff's Sale" made reference only
to pending litigation, not to the security interest of Archer. 9
The court of appeals seemed to rely in part on KRS section
355.9-301(l)(c) to reach its decision, although the section was not
cited in the opinion. The court affirmed the judgement of the trial
court, holding Archer's security interest valid against Tabers:
"Although the 'lapsed' financing statement may not in itself have
been enough to place Tabers on notice of Archer's lien, certainly
Archer's appearance in the judicial proceeding from which the sale
arose, together with his nulla bona execution should have placed
him, as a reasonable man, on notice." 90
The key words in the above passage are "on notice." Since
the court was concerned with whether Tabers had notice of Archer's
security interest, it was probably addressing the arguments of the
parties pertaining to notice and hence the conditions for the pur-
chaser's priority under KRS section 355.9-301(1)(c).
The type of notice, actual or construtive, found by the court
is critical to the application of KRS section 355.9-301(1)(c), which
requires the purchaser to be without "knowledge" of the security
interest. The "definitional cross references" to section 9-301 of
the Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code" direct the
reader to section 1-201 for the definition of "knowledge." KRS
section 355.1-201(25) provides that "[a] person 'knows' or has
'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it."'9 2 Archer
did not contend93 and neither the trial court nor the court of ap-
peals found Tabers had "knowledge" of the security interest. 94
" Brief for Appellee, supra note 82, at 6.
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 77, at 2-3, 6.
90 649 S.W.2d at 203.
The Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code, contained in KRS chapter 355, pro-
vides no "definitional cross references" to supplement the statutory provisions. However,
KRS § 355.9-105(4) (1960) applies the definitions contained in Article One to Article Nine.
92 KRS § 355.1-201(25) (1970).
,3 Brief for Appellee, supra note 82, at 6.
' 649 S.W.2d at 202-04. The court may have believed that Tabers had constructive
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Thus, assuming all other conditions of KRS section 355.9-301(1)(c)
were met, if Tabers did not have actual knowledge of the security
interest, he had priority over Archer and the court of appeals should
have awarded Tabers the Jeep.9"
The court of appeals cited as support KRS section 426.290(1) ,6
which provides that when the defendant owns property subject to
a "bona fide encumbrance" created prior to the execution lien,
the property may be sold subject to the encumbrance. The pur-
chaser, however, acquires only a lien on the property, subject to
the prior encumbrance. 9
Did Tabers only acquire a lien on the Jeep subordinate to the
security interest of Archer? If Archer had a "bona fide encum-
brance," KRS section 426.290 mandates such a result.
The "bona fide encumbrance" language, coupled with the effect
of KRS section 355.9-301(1)(c), should result in an interpretation
of section 426.290(1) which equates "bona fide" with "perfected."
Thus, if the security interest is not perfected, it is not bona fide.
However, no Kentucky cases interpret "bona fide encumbrance."
An argument can be made that "bona fide" means simply that
a good faith encumbrance exists and perfection is irrelevant.
However, such an interpretation is contrary to KRS section
355.9-301(1)(c). In order to construe KRS sections 426.290 and
355.9-301(1)(c) so as to give meaning to both sections, "bona fide
encumbrance" should be interpreted to mean a security interest
which is perfected. 9 Accordingly, Tabers should have been given
a priority in the Jeep over the security interest of Archer under
either KRS section 426.290 or KRS section 355.9-301(1)(c). The
only issue in such cases is whether the purchaser meets the re-
quirements of KRS section 355.9-301(1)(c).
IV. ARTICLE Two AS APPLIED TO EQUIPMENT LEASES
In Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Joseph,99 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals enlarged the scope of Article Two of the Ken-
notice of Archer's security interest. See id. at 203. However, constructive notice, as noted
in the text, is insufficient to give Archer priority over Tabers.
" See KRS § 355.9-301(lXc).
96 649 S.W.2d at 202.
9, See KRS § 426.290(l), (2).
" D. LEIBSON & R. NoWKA, supra, note 86, § 8.4(B)(2), at 754.
,1 641 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
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tucky Uniform Commercial Code by applying it to equipment leases,
and possibly to any lease of goods.' 0 To achieve this result, the
court relied on KRS section 355.2-102 which provides that "[u]nless
the context otherwise requires, this article applies to transactions
in goods."''
Hertz and Joseph entered into a lease of a muffler pipe bend-
ing machine for a period of sixty-six months.' 2 Joseph signed the
lease on the first page. The lease contained additional terms and
conditions below the signature and on the back side of the first
page. 03 When Joseph unilaterally terminated the lease, Hertz sought
to recover the machine and the remaining rentals pursuant to the
terms and conditions appearing below Joseph's signature.' °4
Joseph contended he was not bound by any provisions of the
lease appearing after his signature. He relied on KRS section
446.060(1) which provides that a writing "shall not be deemed to
be signed unless the signature is subscribed at the end or close of
the writing."' 05 Hertz argued that the lease was governed by Arti-
cle Two of the Uniform Commercial Code'16 which contains its
own provisions for testing the validity and enforcement of signed
writings.' 7 The trial court dismissed Hertz's petition. The fact that
Joseph's signature appeared at the bottom of the first page, while
the penalty and termination provisions appeared after the signature
and on back of the first page, was deemed to make these clauses
unsigned and unenforceable.' 8
In 1979, the Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed with an argu-
ment similar to the one advanced by Joseph in R.C. Durr Co.,
Inc. v. Bennett Industries, Inc.'09 There the court, basing its holding
on KRS section 446.060(1), invalidated provisions appearing after
00 Id. at 757.
101 Id..
"02 Brief for Appellee Marcus Joseph at 1, Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Joseph,
641 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
03 641 S.W.2d at 755.
'14 Brief for Appellee, supra note 102, at 2.
"I Id. at 5-6 (citing KRS § 446.060(1) (1975)). See 641 S.W.2d at 756.
106 Brief for Appellant Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. at 9, Hertz Commercial Leasing
Corp. v. Joseph, 641 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). See 641 S.W.2d at 754.
,07 See, e.g., KRS § 355.1-201(39) (1970) (defimes "signed"); KRS § 355.2-201(1) (1960)
(statute of frauds provision for Article Two).
641 S.W.2d at 754-55.
'0' 590 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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the signature in a contract for the sale of steel girders."° In Durr
the court also rejected an argument that KRS section 446.060(1)
was negated by the Uniform Commercial Code. The court stated
that the definition of "signed" in the Uniform Commercial Code
concerns what constitutes a valid signature, not where the signature
must be placed."'
Although the trial court in Hertz cited no statutes or case law
as authority for its decision, the court of appeals assumed the lower
court was guided by the Durr opinion. 2 The court noted that in
Durr the language in the contract which incorporated by reference
other "terms and conditions" on the back of the agreement ap-
peared below the signatures.' 13 In Hertz, Joseph's signature
appeared after the language incorporating by reference the "Terms
and Conditions set forth below." 114 That fact distinguished Hertz
from the rational of Durr.1"5 Accordingly, the court found'16 the
litigation to come within the scope of Childers & Venters, Inc. v.
Sowards,"7 a case where the Court refused to construe KRS sec-
tion 446.060(1) to abolish incorporation of terms and conditions
by reference when the language appeared before the signature.' I
The court of appeals could have ended the opinion at that point,
simply holding that the signature appeared after the language in-
corporating the terms and conditions by reference and thus, such
terms became part of the contract under the Childers rationale.
The case would then have been remanded to the trial court to deter-
mine Hertz's rights under the lease. The court chose, however, to
address what they considered "the most important issue of this
case" namely, whether "the lease agreement... should be governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code.'" " 9
The applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code was thrust
into issue by Hertz, which had stated that: "[tihe single issue...
110 Id. at 339-40.
M Id. at 340.
2 641 S.W.2d at 756.
I13 Id.
"' Id. at 755.
'" Id. at 756.
116 Id.
"' 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970).
' Id. at 344-45.
29 641 S.W.2d at 756.
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is whether the terms of the [1lease which follow[ed] the signatures
of the parties can be enforced against the lessee."' 20 Hertz con-
tended since the Uniform Commercial Code sections regarding the
statute of frauds and the definition of "signed" provide a means
of testing the validity and enforcement of contracts similar to the
one in issue, the court needed to decide whether the lease falls under
the Code, and if so, whether appellee's signature on the lease
satisfies the requirement for enforceability under the Code.' 2' Joseph
countered Hertz's contention that the lease was a transaction in
goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code by arguing that
such a contention runs counter to the rationale of Durr.'22 However,
the leasing of goods has become a widely employed substitute for
purchase. In light of this fact, the court felt "some uniformity
must be extended to the rights and remedies of the parties entering
into these types of agreements."' 23 More than any other factor,
this undoubtedly prompted the court to address the issue.
The court quoted extensively from what it termed the "ap-
propriate philosophy" '24 regarding the issue found in Hertz Com-
mercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Clearing House.'25 In that
case the lessee of equipment defended an action for recovery of
rentals on the ground that the lessor breached the implied warranty
of merchantability. The lessor contended that the lease disclaimed
all warranties. 2 6 At issue was whether the lease was governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code so that any disclaimer of warran-
ties had to comply with the provisions of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.'27 The court noted the trend to substitute a lease for
a sale and stated: "[Ilt would be anomalous if this large body of
commercial transactions [leases] were subject to different rules of
law than other commercial transactions [sales] which tend to the
identical economic result."' 28 The court found the basis for
320 Brief for Appellant, supra note 106, at 4.
" Id. at 9-10.
2 Brief for Appellee, supra note 102, at 7-8. But see text accompanying notes 112-116
supra.
3 641 S.W.2d at 756.
124 Id. at 756-57.
21 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App.
Div. 1970).
326 Id. at 394, 398.
'" Id. at 394.
123 Id. at 395.
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expanding the operation of the Uniform Commercial Code to cover
leases in section 1-102(2) and its Official Comment. The purpose
of the Code is "[tlo simplify, clarify and modernize the law govern-
ing commercial transactions; to permit the continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of
the parties."' 29 This Act "is intended to make it possible for the
law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light
of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices."' 30 Finally,
the court noted:
The very wording of § 2-102 of the Code, defining the scope
of the Article, [Article Two] states: "[u]nless the context other-
wise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods. .."
Clearly, a "transaction" encompasses a far wider area of activity
than a "sale" and it cannot be assumed that the word was
carelessly chosen. 3'
Thus, the New York court found a legal basis for applying
Article Two to leases. It found the rationale to be economic in
nature, due to the wide substitution of leases for sales. The court
concluded: "Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, to the
extent that its provisions can be considered applicable, governs the
equipment lease before the court."' 32
After quoting extensively from the New York court and noting
several other jurisdictions which have reached the same result, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed the purpose of the Uniform
Commercial Code as set forth in KRS section 355.1-102 and found
that the "legislature has sought to simplify, clarify, and moder-
nize the law of commercial transactions as well as permit the con-
tinued expansion of commercial practices and make uniform the
law applicable thereto among the various jurisdictions."' 33 In order
to bring "uniformity to the law governing lease agreements," the
court held that the Uniform Commercial Code is applicable to such
transactions.' 34
Economic reason and the Uniform Commercial Code were both
129 U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1962).
"10 U.C.C. § 1-102(2) comment 1 (1962).
' 298 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (citing U.C.C. § 2-102 (1962)).
,' Id. at 397.
" Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Joseph, 641 S.W.2d at 757.
1" Id.
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considerations for the court's decision. Leases are a widely used
substitute in commerce for purchases when the objective of the
transaction is to use, not consume, the goods. Certainly, the drafters
of the Code could not be expected to foresee every future com-
mercial device employed. They clearly expected the Code to stretch:
"[The Code] is intended to make it possible for the law embodied
in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen
and new circumstances and practices.""' Article Two's "trans-
actions in goods" 13 6 language also indicates that more than "sales"
of goods are within the scope of Article Two.' 37 Thus, the court
of appeals was on sound footing with its holding. Moreover, since
leasing plays an important part in commercial transactions, the
court of appeals was correct in its contention that uniformity must
be brought to the rights and remedies of the parties to such trans-
actions. The Uniform Commercial Code is a tested body of com-
mercial law which can be extended to govern these rights.
Yet, several questions remain unanswered by the court's opin-
ion. The lease in Hertz was an equipment lease. Will this be ex-
tended to all commercial transactions involving a lease, or will it
be restricted to equipment leases? The court spoke in terms of
"business transactions,"' , "lease agreement,'" 39 "equipment rental
commerce,"' 40 and finally, in its holding, "lease agreement."'
4'1
Thus, while the facts of the case present an equipment lease, the
language of the holding appears to apply to all lease agreements.
Of course, the lease must still be one involving goods or Article
Two will not apply.'
42
Notwithstanding the facts of Hertz, it seems the court intend-
ed for its opinion to apply to all leases of goods. The language
of the holding points to such a conclusion, and the court intimated
that, in part, it considered the issue because of the "thousands
31 See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) & comment 1 (1962). See also Hertz Commercial Leasing
Corp. v. Transportation Clearing House, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 for a court so construing the
Code.
06 KRS § 355.2-102.
131 See 641 S.W.2d at 757.
"I Id. at 756.
139 Id.
14o Id.
141 Id. at 757.
141 See KRS § 355.2-102.
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of individual automobiles being leased throughout the
commonwealth." 4 3 The court believed that "some uniformity must
be extended to the rights and remedies of the parties entering into
these types of agreements."' 44 Thus, the court was apparently con-
cerned with leases of goods generally, and the holding may be ap-
plied to any such transactions, not just leases of equipment.
Therefore, the consumer who rents an appliance or an
automobile from a leasing company can cite this case as support
for an argument that Article Two should govern the lease agree-
ment. However, if the facts show a consumer lease, Hertz can only
apply by analogy since its facts involved an equipment lease.'
45
There seems to be no good reason why Article Two should not
apply to all leases of goods. Except for a few sections, Article Two
is not limited to transactions in goods between merchants, but also
applies to consumer transactions. 4 6 In fact, the consumer may most
need the protection of Article Two since he is generally not as
sophisticated in reading and understanding contracts as is the
businessman.
The application of Article Two to leases may pose interpreta-
tion problems with specific sections of the Article. By their own
terms, some sections of Article Two apply to a "contract for
sale," 47 other sections apply to a "contract," 4 1 while still others
apply to "sellers"' 49 and "buyers."' 5 0 Will all or none of these
sections be applicable to the lease agreement? Can a section which
speaks in terms of "contract for sale" or "buyer" and "seller"
apply to the parties of a lease? Since the court remanded the case
it is impossible at this time to determine what sections the trial
court will apply to decide the case.' The court of appeals held
141 641 S.W.2d at 756.
44 Id.
41 An automobile or appliance leased by a consumer might be considered, "equip-
ment," but the classification of an item as a consumer good or equipment will usually de-
pend on the lessee's use. See KRS § 355.9-109(3) (1970). This section also applies to Arti-
cle Two. KRS § 355.2-103(3) (1960).
"' See, e.g., KRS § 355.2-207 (1970).
14 E.g., KRS § 355.2-208(1) (1970).
"' E.g., KRS § 355.2-302 (1970).
'" E.g., KRS § 355.2-313 (1970).
"s E.g., KRS § 355.2-318 (1970).
' The definition of "signed" in KRS § 355.1-201(39) is not restricted to contracts
and thus would appear to be applicable to leases. However, the statute of frauds provi-
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"the Uniform Commercial Code [to be] applicable to such
transactions."' 5 2 But, despite this apparent application of the
Uniform Commercial Code across the board, the court did not
hold the lease was actually a disguised sale. Thus, this area will
need further development by the courts.
Three main groups of cases have held Article Two applicable
to leases. Inclusion in a particular group depends upon the rationale
employed by the court to apply Article Two to a lease agreement.
Some courts have concluded Article Two is applicable because a
lease is a "transaction in goods.' ' 5 3 Hertz is such a case. Other
courts have found Article Two applicable because the terms of
the lease are sufficiently analogous to a "sale of goods" to be in
reality a disguised sale. 11 4 The third group of courts has determined
that certain provisions of Article Two are applicable by analogy
to leases when the lease involves the same factors on which Article
Two is premised.
55
Many of the cases which have considered this issue are war-
ranty cases and have applied the warranty provisions of Article
Two to a lease, even though the warranty sections (KRS sections
355.2-313 to -315) speak of warranties made by a "seller." Only
the cases in the last group avoid this problem, since they apply
Article Two by analogy and thus the labels used by the drafters
to identify the parties affected are not relevant. The Kentucky courts
must wrestle with the argument that although a lease may be con-
sidered a transaction in goods so that Article Two generally applies,
certain sections, by their own terms, remain inapplicable. If the
sions, KRS § 355.2-201(1), speaks specifically of "contracts;" therefore its application would
be uncertain. Without further guidance, the application of provisions like the statute of
frauds will remain questionable.
15 641 S.W.2d at 757.
" See, e.g., In re Vaillancourt, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callahan) 748 (D. Me. 1970);
Owens v. Patteon Scaffolding Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. qt. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1975); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transpor-
tation Credit Clearing House, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 392, rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.Y.S.2d
585 (App. Div. 1970).
1*4 See, e.g., United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apartments, 319 N.Y.S.2d
531 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 293 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1965).
"I See, e.g., KLPR TV, Inc., v. Visual Elecs. Corp., 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972);
Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 428 S.W.2d 46 (Ark. 1968); W.E. Johnson Equip. Co.
v. United Airlines, 238 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
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Code is "liberally construed and applied to promote its underly-
ing purposes and policies" and is "to be developed by the courts
in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices," 1
57
then this internal conflict should be resolved in favor of applica-
tion of such provisions.
,56 KRS § 355.1-201(1) (1970).
"I U.C.C. § 1-201 comment 1 (1962).
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